Saff Views Iran's Naval Doctrine

Unclassified

Document ID: IAP20000226000048

Version Number: 01

Region: Near East/South Asia

Sub-Region: South Asia

Country: Iran

Topic: DOMESTIC POLITICAL, MILITARY

Source-Date: 11/21/1999

Saff Views Iran's Naval Doctrine

 IAP20000226000048 Tehran Saff in Persian 21 Dec 99 pp 32-35 

[Article by Rear Admiral Ashkbus Daneh-Kar entitled "Operational Doctrine of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (issue No. 235) ]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Preface [subhead]  

     Operational doctrine, or operational handbook, means the way strategic operations are made possible through rational application of tactical moves as required by the doctrine behind the overall strategy of action. 

     In short, we may say that operational doctrine provides the required guidelines for execution of stand-by instructions assigned to any given force under conditions when no specific instructions have previously been given. 

     In the absence of an operational doctrine - or in case of having to rely on an inadequate operational doctrine - we shall not be able to size up the existing situation correctly and so we shall fail to meet challenges and threats.   That is, we cannot perform our tasks - whether offensive or defensive - adequately. 

     Meanwhile, it must be said that the coverage of the operational doctrine of the naval forces is, of necessity, very expansive.   At the same time, equipment, hardware and software deployed in naval warfare are very complicated.   Therefore, without relying on a set of coordinated principles related to the operational doctrine and indeed without having a proper grasp of the nature of the future wars, the navy cannot confront eventual situations. 

     It must also be said that the past success of our Navy cannot guarantee success in future because all doctrines will have to be revised and brought up to date through constant appraisal during implementation of its principles. 

     A doctrine is a phenomenon which connects related principles to operational aims and indicates how those aims can be achieved.   And the applicability of any doctrine can be assessed during operational phase.   So, we must recognize the vital importance of operational doctrines if we are to be fully aware of all the implications of modern warfare - the kind of war which may come our way in future. 

     Let us stress here that we need to gain experience of real situation in a modern warfare and that could be achieved by paying attention to operational doctrine.   Its importance can be assessed even better when we realize that the only experience we have about modern warfare is that of the second Persian Gulf war [Kuwaiti war].   Some aspects of that war could be designated as modern warfare.   Of course, we do have some experiences in modern warfare through the Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons during the eight-year war.   These experiences include some knowledge of the damages inflicted and their subsidiary consequences. 

     With regard to nuclear warfare the only experience gained by humanity is that which was gained when America exploded atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as the use of uranium based weapons in the Persian Gulf war. 

     Now, with regard to the fact that India and Pakistan have already tested nuclear weapons and also with regard to the fact that Israel is in possession of nuclear capability, we must, in fact, take account of their impact on future modern wars.   Therefore, the deployment of tactical biological, chemical and nuclear weapons against the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran in any likely future war - which would have the character of a modern warfare - is a possibility we cannot dismiss.   And that possibility has affected the operational doctrine of our naval forces.    

     How to adopt a suitable operational doctrine for the Navy? [subhead]  

     The Islamic Republic of Iran has a unique strategical position in West Asia.   Iran is the only country which possesses two large seas - one on the south and the other on the north.   As such she is the only most reliable overland bridge between Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia.   At the same time, sea routes to all of these continents are in one way or the other connected to our territorial waters.    

     Indeed, Iran has a unique situation in the Persian Gulf.   She is the only country having 2,000 kilometres of continuous coastal territory from one end of the Persian Gulf to the other and then, with no interruption, on to the Sea of Oman.   Situated along this long coast are a number of natural and man-made inlets, estuaries and protected shores.   In a regional war in future, this geopolitical situation provides a number of offensive and defensive advantages for the Islamic Republic of Iran irrespective of the rival's military potential.   That is, enjoying these advantages our Navy would be able to maintain its supremacy in the sea and inflict heavy blow to the enemy's sea power.   Indeed, Iran's natural geographic advantages provide the Navy with the option of seriously limiting the enemy's manoeuvrability in the Persian Gulf.   Also the relative narrowness of the width of the Persian Gulf and parts of the Sea of Oman provides the Islamic Republic of Iran to mount amphibious and naval attacks on the enemy bases and installations.   Iranian navy's ability to mount punitive and destructive attacks is enhanced because of the fact that numerous islands in the Persian Gulf belong to her. 

     All these points prove that, in case of the emergence of a regional war it is vitally important for the Iranian navy to maintain its supremacy in the Persian Gulf and to extend its supremacy to the enemy shores and islands in the region.   That would be a major principle of operational doctrine for the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially in its amphibious operations. 

     Indeed, the above principle of the Navy's operational doctrine was fully responsible for the Islamic Republic of Iran to maintain the security of the homeland's coastal areas and islands during the eight years of holy defence.   It was the same principle in the Navy's operational doctrine which stopped Iraq from exporting its oil through the Persian Gulf route.   In fact, by capturing al-Bakr, al-Omayyeh and Fav early in the war the Islamic Republic of Iran imposed a naval embargo on Iraq.   That is why the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy has the largest and most diverse amphibious capability in the area.   Our Navy's amphibious capability is boosted by large and small personnel carrying craft, air-sea craft of BH7 type, amphibious boats, barges and launches.   These naval vessels are, meanwhile, equipped with strong fire power. 

     Meanwhile, our Navy's operational doctrine takes note of the fact that the Persian Gulf has limited width and depth.   As a result of such natural situation, sea and shipping lanes have to follow limited number of routes and this fact gives advantages to our Navy's planners.   Noting the great technological advances achieved in manufacture of anti-ship missiles and their high degree of precision, our Navy's planners have assigned a special task to operations involving the deployment of various kinds of missiles for operations in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.   Anti-ship missiles, fired either from shore batteries, aircraft or from fast naval vessels, plays a leading role.   That is why the developing countries of the Persian Gulf are at the top of countries relying on missile weapons systems.   Indeed, our Navy has taken long strides in development of its missile weapons system and is expanding its plans in this regard. 

     The shallowness of the Persian Gulf - resulting in forcing shipping lanes to adopt limited number of narrow routes - is an important factor from another point of view which has affected the operational doctrine of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.   That natural situation - and the fact that the shipping lanes must of necessity be confined to specific routes - means that laying mines in the Persian Gulf would be a suitable operation for any adversary. 

     Indeed, the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf to laying mines was well exposed during the eight years of holy defence.   That was also the case during the second Persian Gulf war [the Kuwaiti operation].   Therefore, capability to lay mines and to sweep mines must occupy a special place in the operational doctrine of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

     Meanwhile, there are numerous ports, oil terminals, industrial installations and rich resources in the Persian Gulf area - on the coastal areas, in the continental shelf and on the numerous islands.   As a result, the Persian Gulf becomes specifically a vulnerable target for special [commando] operations.   Therefore, the operational doctrine of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran must also pay the due attention to reliance on special [commando] operations as a viable and effective capability in case of a regional war. 

     The mounting of special operations are further enhanced because of the existence of numerous inlets on the coastal strip of the Persian Gulf and its islands.   These inlets are close to shipping lanes and even to some sea ports and as a result fast gunboats can be equipped to carry out special hit and run operations and exploit the protective umbrella of the inlets.   Therefore, the operational doctrine of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is well advised to deploy, for its offensive and defensive tactical operations, specially designed fast boats; they could be operated for hit and run missions as part of operations to harass the enemy and achieve advantageous positions. 

     Of course, it must noted that the existence of heavy traffic in the Persian Gulf affects both natural and man-made features of the said water-way especially as it has a shallow depth.   This situation makes the waterway extremely vulnerable to electronics and anti-computer and radar warfare.   Therefore, in the operational doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy special attention must be paid to that state of affairs.   The Navy must make sure that it maintains secure communications channels specially in electronics warfare. 

     On the other hand, the Sea of Oman and the Strait of Hormoz are relatively deep and that provides suitable ground for ordinary submarine operations.   Since the Sea of Oman is the first defence perimeter of the Persian Gulf, submarine operations rank high in the priorities of the operational doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.   The Navy must consider the Sea of Oman as its specific operational field for deployment of submarines in both offensive and defensive postures. 

     Meanwhile, it is of immense importance to develop the kind of capability required to maintain a strong naval presence [in the Sea of Oman] without dependence on port facilities.   That means that in the operational doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy provision must be made for acquisition of special logistics craft to support the sea-bound naval units. 

     Another consideration is the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman to air attacks because of their limited width.   However, according to the operational doctrine of the Navy, the air defence of the area is assigned to the Khatam ol-Anbia Air Base.   So, it seems the air cover for [naval units of] the area, especially at low flying levels, is well provided - of course to the extent that available weapons system would allow. 

     Generally speaking, the operational doctrine of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, designed with regard to the situations experienced in the past, seems to have been suitable - to some extent.   However, every operational doctrine is in need of constant revision. 

     Of course, a review of the history of the past operations and also a careful study of the on-going manoeuvres would be essential handbooks which staff officers must study in the course of their planning to review and revise the force's operational doctrine.   Obviously, the course of events and every factor under study must receive rational and objective analysis.   The acquired data must be related and collated in the most rational manner and their findings must influence the final version of the operational doctrine. 

     Meanwhile, findings of the objective and rational studies must also be studied at Staff College level of the Navy.   Moreover, these studies will have to be carefully integrated in on-going planning operations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy as well as in operational areas where units are assigned to carry out their tasks.   Aspects of the operational doctrine, not yet empirically tested, must be incorporated in the naval and combined forces manoeuvres as well as in other war exercises.   They must also be taught at military schools teaching tactical skills. 

     At the same time note must be taken of the new weapons system entering the service of the friendly armed forces as well as others.   Any new and modern weapons entering the region must be noted and their offensive and defensive potentials reviewed. 

     Operational Doctrine of the Navy Seen against Changes in Technology and our Economic Base [subhead]  

     We cannot develop the Navy's operational doctrine in isolation.   To develop an operational doctrine we cannot remain oblivious to overall technological situation of our military industries and weapons systems of our armed forces.   Nor can we go on formulating our doctrine without due regard to the country's economic capability. 

     In fact, if we had no limitations with regard to access to resources, we could have devised such an operational doctrine which could respond to all threats we could imagine.   Of course, even then our operational doctrine could not have been perfect because so many factors are involved that nobody can possibly foresee them all. 

     In other words, there is no guarantee that the operational doctrine we formulate would be perfect and all-inclusive.   Here an example would throw light on the subject.   During the eight years of holy defence, for air defence the operational doctrine of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran envisaged reliance on the operations to be carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force.   The [regular] Air Force was to provide air cover for the friendly merchant shipping fleets as well as for the region.   Now we know that the Navy endured considerable damages and hardship because of being dependent on the Air Force for air cover.   Another point was that during the eight years of holy defence we did not develop anti-submarine capability because the enemy did not have submarines.   But can we be sure that the same situation would prevail in future? 

     An operational doctrine would be successful only if it pays due attention to the existing available technology in the country as well as the country's economic power.   Obviously, it is also of vital importance to take into account the policy of the State as to how much resources are to be allocated to the Navy.   The size of resource allocation will determine the ability of the Navy on how to plan its future expansion, what kind of weapons systems to acquire and, more importantly, how to build up its strength in relation to the other branches of the country's armed forces as well as in relation to the navies and armed forces of the other regional countries. 

     Looked at from a wider perspective the Navy's operational doctrine must be devised as part of national defence strategy.   That is because the naval warfare is not separate from the overall defence operations of the realm. 

     In devising the operational doctrine of the Navy one must constantly remember that the Navy is only one arm of the overall armed might of the country.   The Navy will be at war when the entire country has already been embroiled in a national war.   That truism is all the more important under the present conditions. 

     As a result, the operational doctrine of the Navy must be fully flexible.   As an example it must be said that the operational doctrine of the Navy during the eight years of the holy defence had not made provisions for war operations on land.   Nor was there any provision to defend land-based positions.   Of course, the Navy did have marine regiments [before the war started].   But their mission was to guide other forces to establish bridgeheads during the beginning of planned amphibious operations. 

     However, when the war broke out our military's defence strategy forced us [the Navy] to deploy our marine regiment to defend the port city of Khorramshahr [when the Iraqi launched a surprise attack].   Later, the need to defend [Iranian] islands and other port cities forced us [the Navy] to organize more efficient and large marine forces; we established marine brigades and consequently considerably increased our land-based defence capabilities.    

     [Saff announced that this feature would be continued in its next issue, but Saff No. 236 did not carry the second part of this article.]

     BBCCMM

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